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TIill ALLOWED RATE OF RETURN VS. THE MARGINAL COST
OF CAPITAL IN A PUBLIC UTILITY RATE CASE
By
H. Craig Petersen
Private electric and telephone utilities in the United States are
regulated on a rate of return on capital basis.

For many years, students

of regulation have argued that this type of regulation does not provide
utilities with any incentive to be efficient in their provision of service.
In 1962, Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson provided analytical support for
the proposition that such regulation tends to result in inefficient pro1

duct ion.

Averch and Johnson demonstrate that the firm subject to a

regulatory constraint has an incentive to use more

capit~l

in production

than would be the case if costs were to be minimized.
Averch and Johnson (A-J) consider a monopoly producing a single homogeneours product using two inputs:

capital, K; and labor, L.

The produc-

tion function is given by:
Q

=

Q(K,L)

K

~

0, L

with
~

°

dQ/aL ~ 0, aQ/aK ~
Q(O,K)

= Q(L,O)

°
°

The price which Q can be sold for is P = P(Q) with ap/aQ

6

0.

Profits

are PQ-r K-wL where rand ware the factor prices of capital and labor resn

n

pectively.
The firm is regulated on a rate of return on capital basis.
PQ - wL

~

That is:

sK

where s is the allowed return on capital.
The A-J model rests on three basic assumptions.

First, it is assumed

that the objective of the firm is the maximization of profits.
there is no regulatory lag.
be instantaneous.
adjustment.

Second, that

That is, the process of regulation is taken to

Excess or deficient profits immediately result in a rate

Third, the allowed return on capital, s, is greater than the

cost of capital, r .
n

In the A-J model, the objective of the firm is to maximize profits
subject to the regulatory constraint.

The analytical solution is generated

by deriving the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a maximum.

For the

2

unregulated profit-maximizing firm these are the familiar marginal conditions
that the negative of the rate of technical substitution between inputs in
producing a given level of output be equal to the ratio of the market prices
of the inputs.
The imposition of the regulatory constraint results in a different
optimizing condition in the A-J analysis:
-dL

r

dK

w

A
---(1- A)

n

(s-r )
n

w

> O. The authors show (subject to criticism and
2
refinement by later writers) that 0 < A <1. Hence, the expression
By assumption s-r

n

(s-r )
n

(1- A)

w

is positive and, thus, the rate of technical substitution

is less than the ratio of factor prices.

The first order conditions of the

model reveal that the labor input is used only until the value of its marginal
product is equated to the factor price, w.

The above result is obtained

because capital is used beyond the point where the value of its marginal
product equals its factor price, r .
n

Intuitively, what occurs is that the firm is constrained as to the amount
of total profits which it may earn, and seeks means of circumventing the
regulatory constraint.

This is accomplished by overutilizing capital.

In

that the firm is allowed to earn more on each additional unit of capital
employed than the cost of that capital to the firm, up to some point, profits
are increased by substitution of capital for the other input, labor.
Another way of looking at the result is to view the excess return, s - r ,
n
as a subsidy granted to the use of capital. The firm in its decision-making
maximizes profits by using each input until its value in production equals its
cost, but because each unit of capital is subsidized, the firm does not use
the market cost of capital in the decision process, but some shadow price of
capital less than r .
n

It utilizes capital until the value of the marginal

product of that input is driven down to this shadow price.

In this view,

the firm behaves in the same manner that any other profit-maximizing firm
would behave, but considers different input prices.

3

The assumption that the allowed return is greater than the cost of capital
has been frequently criticized; especially during the late 1960s when capital
costs were increasing rapidly.

An articulate criticism is that of Corey.

He maintains that the "marginal return allowed on an added increment of capital
is ordinarily insufficient to cover the marginal cost of the added capita1.,,3
Corey argues that, while the rate of return allowed may be set in excess of the
average cost of capital to the firm in compensation for regulatory lag or
inflation, the allowed return is considerably less than the marginal cost of
new capital under current market conditions.

His assessment of current

regulatory policy is that:
To my knowledge, no electric power company has in recent
years been allowed a rate of return sufficient to cover the
ever-increasing marginal cost of new capital on which plant
investment and replacement decisions are based. This is due
in large part to the use of historically low embedded costs,
a practice which provides a disincentive to invest. Under
these conditions, the A-J model may imply that capita1 inputs
4
of regulated companies are unduly discouraged.
As a case in point, he cites Commonwealth Edison's most recent (at the
time) experience with the Illinois Commerce Commission:
... the 7-percent return more recently allowed in our July 10,
1970 rate order was clearly below the marginal rates of 8~ percent to 9~ percent paid on new money securities sold in 1970. 5
It is the contention of this author that a much closer look at the cost
of capital to the firm versus the return allowed by the commission is required
to determine whether the "excess return over capital cost" assumption of the
A-J model is met.

Corey correctly observes that it is the marginal return

on new investment which must be greater than the marginal cost if there is
to be an over-capitalization incentive.

The point to be argued here is

that these marginal conditions may hold even though

the average allowed

return as specified by the commission is less than the marginal cost of new
capital if the commission adheres to a rather common practice in determining
the rate of return.

A simple mathematical exercise is used to illustrate

the contention in the abstract, then the actual results of two commission cases,
one in Montana, and the other the very case referred to by Corey in his argument
against the excess return assumption will be presented as evidence as to what
can happen in actual rate cases.

It is the author's belief that the two cases

4

cited are representative of the practice of a number of state commissions.
The Montana case has been selected because the results are rather dramatic,
but the Illinois case was chosen solely because it was presented by Corey
as being evidence against the excess return assumption.
In developing a simple model to demonstrate the robustness of the
excess return assumption it is assumed that the firm over-capitalizes by
adding non-productive capital (e.g., rate base padding).
innocuous simplifying assumption.

This is an

Zajac has shown this strategy always

to be dominated by the incentive to substitute capital for other inputs
in the production process.

6

The important aspect of the model is · the manner in which the cost of
capital is determined by the regulatory commission.

The assumed procedure

is that the cost of capital is taken by the commission to be the weighted
average of embedded costs of debt, preferred, and equity capital.

When

new capital is added, the firm goes to the commission for an adju·s tment
which is made by recomputing the embedded cost of capital in the same manner
so that it includes the cost of the newly-acquired investment.

An important question is the accuracy of the result of the cost of
capital determination.

There is usually a considerable discrepancy be-

tween the numbers claimed by the firm and those presented by the commission
staff.

The final decision by the commission usually falls somewhere in

between.

For the present we assume the commission deliberations have

resulted in the true embedded cost of capital to the firm.

The consequences

of error in this part of the procedure are considered later.
The embedded or "bare-bones cost of capital" is not always equal to the
rate of return allowed by the commission.

An increment may be added in

recognition of future financing plans of the firm, the reality of regulatory
lag, and/or the effects of inflation.
results of such an "add-on."

We turn next to an analysis of the

The following notation is adopted:

K = capital base of the firm
r

a

=

average cost of capital as determined by the commission

5

r

r

a

marginal cost of new capital

n

=

s
s

new average cost of capital as computed by the commission
after the addition of new capital by the firm

*

n

average return as allowed by the regulatory commission

=

average allowed return after the addition of new capital

b

percent increase in K of non-productive capital

d

percent of the bare-bones cost of capital which the commission
adds on· or substracts as a matter of policy or judgment.

If K is the original rate base, then K+bK=(l+b)K is the new rate
base after the acquisition of non-productive capital.

The proportion of

new capital in the rate base is b/(l+b) and of old, l/(l+b).
the weights which will be applied to each cost component.
r

ok

a

n

Thus,

= br n

+ ra
l+b
l+b

is the new embedded cost of capital.
s

These are

The new allowed rate of return is

r *(l+d).
a
Prior to the capital expansion, total cost of capital to the firm was

r K and the total return allowed was r (l+d)K.
a

a

fits were dr K.
a

Thus, allowed excess pro-

After addition of new capital, the cost is r *K(l+b) and
a

the allowed return s K(l+b).
n

Excess profits are then (dr +dbr )K.
a

n

The

change in excess profits is d(r bK).
n

Since r ,K, and b are all positive, whether or not there is an
n

incentive to expand the rate base to earn additional excess profits depends
on "d", the commission's policy on- the allowed rate of return versus the
embedded cost of capital.

If the commission tacks something on, then the

firm can increase profits by adding capital.
ferent.

If not, the firm is indif-

If "d" is negative, then there is an incentive to under-capitalize.

The model says nothing about plausible values for "d".
tion to be determined on the basis of factual evidence.

This is a ques-

The model does

demonstrate, however, that the incentive to over-invest does not require
that the fair return allowed by commissions on all capital be greater than
the cost of new capital to the firm.

What is required is that the marginal

6

return be greater than the marginal cost.

If lid" is positive, this condition

is met.

The firm acquires new capital at a marginal cost of r , and is allowed
n
a marginal return of (l+d)r •
n

The next few pages are devoted to arguing that lid" is often positive,
i.e., that the marg i nal rate of return allowed on new capital is frequently
set above the marginal cost of capital.

Two examples are included for

purpose of illustration.
Commission practices differ with respect to the manner of determining
the rate base.

At one extreme are original costs states which take capital

at its book value.

Reproduction cost states are at the other end of the

spectrum.
In such states the cost of reproducing the capital stock is considered.
Fair value states lie in between these extremes.

In these states, the com-

mission gives some recognition to inflation, but has discretion as to the
degree of recognition.
In original cost rate base jurisdictions the decision process of the
commission is relatively explicit.

The rate base can be modified somewhat

by choice of items to be excluded or included, but commission latitude
slight compared to fair value and reproduction cost states.

is

Fair value and

reproduction cost rate bases may vary anywhere from equal to original cost
to almost double.

In the Montana case to be examined, the fair value was

set at 172% of original cost.

This is extreme, however, usually fair value

is set in the range of 100 to 135% of original cost.
Studies by Eiteman and Stuart suggest that the allowed return is higher
7
in fair value states than in original cost jurisdictions.
If original cost
states allow a return at least equal to the cost of capital, then, unless capital
costs are much higher in fair value states, the latter type of rate base valuation
may result in an allowed return in excess of the cost of capital.
Thus far it has been assumed that the commission accurately computes the
true embedded cost of capital to the firm, but the lack of an accepted method
for determining equity costs leaves room for considerable doubt.

If com-

missions err on the high side in deriving the embedded cost, then the firms
have an incentive to over-capitalize.

If the embedded cost is set lower than

the true average cost of capital and there is no add-on, then there may be
an incentive to under-capitalize.

7

Two examples demonstrate that the excess return assumption of A-J is more
robust than might be assumed.

On April 14, 1961, the Montana Power Company

filed with the Montana Public Service Commission a petition to increase rates
on natural gas sales.

This

petition was granted in part on February 2, 1962.

Montana is a fair value state by statute and decision of the state
supreme court.

The original cost rate base as accepted by the commission

was $52,378,413 as of December 31, 1962.

The commission determined fair

value to be $89,900,000, which is 171.6% of original cost.

The reasoning

behind the fair value figure is not given, it is simply stated that the como

mission "has considered the elements of value."

9

The capital structure of the firm was determined to be 49% equity, 11%
preferred, and 40% debt.

The average costs of debt, preferred, and equity

were taken as 3.22%, 4.60%, and 8.36% respectively.

Thus, the embedded or

average cost of capital is:
Debt

3.22% X 40%

1.2880

Preferred

4.60% X 11%

0.5060

Equity

8.36% X 49%

4.0964
5.8904%

Weighted Average

The 5.89% cost of capital figure was also the rate of return allowed by
the commission.

The salient point is that in determining the amount of net

income which was to be allowed the firm, this return was applied to the fair
value, not the original cost rate base.
firm was allowed a return of 5.89 X 1.714

On an original cost rate base the

= 10.109%.

To demonstrate how fair value rate making may provide an A-J incentive
even in times of very high capital costs, we consider the Illinois case pre10
viously cited by Corey.
At the time the case was heard (1970), capital
costs were very high; the interest rate on long-term debt was on the order
of 9%.
On August 15, 1969, Commonwealth Edison petitioned the Illinois Commerce
Commission for a general electric rate increase.

On July 10, 1970, the com-

pany was granted a portion of the proposed increase.
is, by judicial decision, a fair value state.

Like Montana, Illinois

8
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The original cost rate base as adopted by the commission was $2,056,462,836
as of June 30, 1969.
original cost.

Fair value was set as $2,414,558,000, which is 117.4% of

Again, the commission did not specify the exact procedure used

in determining fair value, it merely states that it has given "full and proper
consideration to all the evidence. ,,11 The commission allowed $170,621,000 as a
justifiable return to capital.

This translates to 7.066% on a fair value

rate base and 8.297% on original cost.
The method used by the commission in determining the cost of capital is
not given.
pany.

Amore detailed case for the cost of capital is made by the com-

We will adopt the numbers as claimed by Commonwealth Edison, recog-

nizing that the result may be much higher than the cost of capital implicitly
determined by the commission.

In doing so, we present the strongest case

against the excess return allowance.

The true excess return should be at

least as great as is found using the numbers proposed by the company.
Edison's witnesses claimed the cost of equity capital was 13%, preferred
8%, and the average cost of debt 4.94%.

The capital weights are not given,

but those reported to the Federal Power Commission as of December 31, 1969
12
will be used.
The embedded cost of capital is:
Equity
Preferred
Debt
Weighted Average

13%

X

36.2%

4.706

8%

X

5.4%

0.432

4.94%

X

58.4%

2.885
8.023

The computed cost of capital of 8.023% compares favorably with the
estimate of the company witnesses of 7.98 - 7.99%.

The allowed rate of

return was set at 8.297 on original cost; the cost of capital is computed
to be 8.023, thus, the allowed returun is 103.4% of the cost of capital.
In terms of the model, "d" is positive, and there exists an incentive to
over-capitalize.

A simple example of possible behavior of Commonwealth

Edison is provided to demonstrate the incentive.
Assume that the firm proposes to add 10% to its rate base in nonproductive capital and then go to the Illinois Commerce Commission for a
rate adjustment.

The expansion is to be financed using proportions of debt

and equity equal to the present capital structure.

Further, suppose that

9

the cost of equity and new preferred stock is unchanged, but debt jumps to
9%.

Relaxing these assumptions alters only the size of the numbers; the

conclusion is unaffected.
The commission first recomputes the embedded cost of capital to include
the newly-acquired debt.

The weights of each component of capital are un-

changed as are the average cost of equity and preferred capital.

The average

cost of debt must be recomputed to reflect 10/11 of total debt at the previous
average cost of 4.94% and 1/11 at a marginal cost of 9%.
debt is now 5.30%.

The average cost of

Thus, the new embedded cost of capital as determined by

the commission is:
Equity
Preferred
Debt

13% X 36.2%

4.706

5.4%

0.432

5.3% X 58.4%

3.095

8% X

Weighted Average

8.233%

If the commission maintains its policy of setting the allowed return at
103.4% of the computed cost of capital, then the allowed return is 8.513% on
the original cost rate base which has been expanded 10% to $2,262,109,110.
Thus, the total net return allowed on the new rate base is $192,573,349 as
compared to the previously-granted return of $170,621,000 on the old rate
base--an increase of $21,952,349.

The rate base is 10% or $205,646,284 larger,

so the marginal return of the added capital is $21,952,349 / $205,646,284 or
10.675%.

The marginal cost of the new capital is the weighted cost of the

new equity, preferred, and debt, and is determined to be 10.394%.

The firm

thus, has an incentive to undertake the proposed capital expansion in that
the marginal return is greater than the marginal cost.
The discussion can be summarized as follows.

If the commission allows

more than the bare-bones cost of capital, and if the embedded cost of capital
is re-computed to include newly-acquired capital, then the firm increases profits
. by

adding additional capital even though the allowed rate of return on all

capital is less than the marginal cost of new capital.

Thus, the A-J assumption

on cost of capital vs. the allowed return on capital is more likely to be met
than it would appear to be on the basis of casual analysis.
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